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“This is our land now”

Lord’s Resistance Army attacks in Bas Uele, northeastern Congo

By Ledio Cakaj

Executive summary

Groups from the Lord’s Resistance Army continue to attack civilians throughout central Africa.¹ Attacks against civilians in a remote corner of Bas Uele district in northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo go largely unnoticed. Unlike most areas where the LRA operates, attacks in northern Bas Uele are intended to empty the area—of strategic importance to the LRA’s cross-border movement to the Central African Republic, or CAR—of civilians. The lack of a meaningful military force to challenge the LRA has turned the northern region of Bas Uele into a veritable haven for the brutal rebel group.

The entire region of Bas Uele has been targeted by the LRA for the last 15 months. Enough documented 51 separate attacks and 105 deaths caused by the LRA in Bas Uele through April 2010. This brings the total number of people killed by the LRA in Congo since December 2008 to nearly 2,500.²

At least 570 people were abducted in Bas Uele during this period, and more than 80 remain with the rebels, including 52 children.³ As is common practice for the LRA, abducted children are forced to fight or used as sex slaves.

LRA violence has caused significant population displacement. Close to 58,000 people are internally displaced in Bas Uele and more than 5,000 people—mostly from Bas Uele—live in refugee camps in the towns of Zemio, Mboki, and Obo in CAR. Killings, abductions, and population displacement have continued unabated in the past few months.

LRA fighters have used Bas Uele as an important base and transit point to CAR where the majority of LRA fighters and commanders have been based in recent months. LRA violence in Bas Uele is intended to depopulate the area north of Ango and south of the CAR border. Eyewitnesses said that LRA fighters killed, abducted, and beat many civilians. Those released were told by LRA commanders to abandon their homes and move to CAR; their lands were confiscated by the LRA who uses abductees as forced laborers to cultivate the land.

Troops from the Congolese national army, or FARDC, are too few and lack requisite training to challenge the LRA's seizure of the area. Unpaid for months and not receiving food rations, FARDC troops steal from the local population. Due to the lack of any supervision and controls, FARDC troops widely abuse the civilians they were sent to protect.


The U.N. mission in Congo, MONUSCO, has peacekeepers in only one location in Bas Uele, in Dingila. Despite the small number of peacekeepers, their presence has deterred LRA attacks in and around Dingila. MONUSCO is in the process of withdrawing peacekeepers from Dingila, a decision actively opposed by the local community who fear LRA attacks. Peacekeepers in Dingila should not be withdrawn; instead more blue helmets should deploy to other towns in Bas Uele such as Ango and Banda to protect the population from LRA attacks and their own predatory army. The drawdown of U.N. forces is in line with the Congolese government's desires and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1925.⁴ This should be carried out while anticipating LRA activity and focusing military forces to minimize their threat to civilians. FARDC soldiers also tend to behave better when U.N. troops are present, as Enough researchers have observed in areas of neighbouring Haut Uele.⁵

After signing into law the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act on May 24, 2010, the Obama administration is developing a comprehensive strategy to deal with the LRA. Any viable strategy needs to take into account the importance of Bas Uele to the LRA as well as ensure that civilians, including the thousands of internally displaced in DRC and refugees in CAR, are protected.

LRA attacks in Bas Uele


On March 15, 2009 a group of LRA fighters attacked the relatively large town of Banda, the first LRA attack in Bas Uele territory—a territory that, because of its proximity to the Congo-CAR border, is strategically important to the rebel group.⁶ The LRA group that attacked Banda was composed of around 80 fighters under the command of

Bas Uele District



Source: OCHA

Lord's Resistance Army: Reported Attacks, Displacement and Peacekeepers



Source: U.S. Department of State, Humanitarian Information Unit

Lieutenant Colonel Achellam Smart. The assault on Banda was part of a series of attacks in retaliation for Operation Lightning Thunder—the Ugandan led attack against LRA bases in Garamba National Park. By the beginning of January 2009, the LRA killed more than 900 people in similar attacks in Duru, Faradje, and Doruma.⁷

Smart's group, which attacked Bangadi in Haut Uele on their way to Banda, walked for three months to reach Banda.⁸ The population of Banda, including workers from international NGOs and the national army, did not expect the LRA to attack so far west into Congo and were caught by surprise. The LRA killed more than 30 people in and around Banda and abducted 58 people, including two expatriate workers from Médecins Sans Frontières, or MSF, who were later released unharmed.⁹ More than 30 people from Banda are still believed to be with the LRA.¹⁰

LRA attacks have since grown more frequent and show no signs of slowing down.¹¹ Following the Banda attack, the LRA group split into smaller groups and began attacks to the north and south. In late March, within a period of just a couple of days, LRA contingents attacked Zamoy, 18 km north of Banda in the direction of CAR; Melinda, 50 km south of Banda; and Boso, 65 km south of Banda.¹² The town of Boso has been particularly hard hit; the LRA targeted Boso four times between March and July of 2009—always on Sundays, a market day when the Mbororo pastoralists come to Boso to trade cows and milk for agricultural produce.¹³

Until recently, the LRA had not been able to move south across the Uele River, a large body of water usually considered difficult to cross. But recent attacks south of Uele in Poko territory indicate that an LRA group successfully crossed the river. A large number of internally displaced people based in Dingila, west of Poko, risk being targeted by the advancing LRA as U.N. peacekeepers are now withdrawing from that area.

LRA groups in northern Bas Uele frequently attack civilians. One village, Sukadi, was attacked in June and October 2009 and January and February 2010.¹⁴ The nearby villages of Digba, Gwane, and Makorombo were attacked in October and November 2009, and February 2010.¹⁵ On March 1, 2010, the LRA attacked Dakwa, killing two people.¹⁶ At least 15 people were killed in these attacks and more than 60 people abducted, of whom 40 remain with the LRA.¹⁷

The LRA's objective has been to expel the population of Bas Uele. LRA fighters in northern Ango territory in Bas Uele explicitly told the local population to leave for CAR. In February 2010, for instance, the rebels caught five women from Sukadi. They were undressed, beaten, and told to leave their homes immediately. "This is our land now, not yours," the LRA commander told them.¹⁸

The emptied lands are cultivated by LRA abductees. Given the lack of any pursuing forces, LRA groups have been able to settle north of Ango, living off the land and looting the few remaining people—mostly the elderly and those who cannot walk for days to reach Zemio in CAR.

LRA strategy in Bas Uele and Congo

Throughout 2009, the LRA used Bas Uele as a safe haven.¹⁹ Kony seemed aware of the strategic importance of Bas Uele and sent LRA groups to Banda immediately after Operation Lightning Thunder. On December 16, 2008, two days after the Ugandan army bombed LRA bases in Garamba, Kony met with most of his commanders, according to former LRA fighters.²⁰ He ordered retaliation attacks to be carried out and assigned his most important commanders to control various areas in Congo and Sudan. After staying in DRC until May 2009, Kony moved to CAR with two top commanders and a large group of fighters.²¹

Lieutenant Colonel Smart was ordered to attack Banda and settle near the CAR border in northern Ango territory.²² The purpose was to stretch the Ugandan army as far west as possible – deflecting attention from Kony’s move into CAR – and to secure the road from CAR into Congo. Kony’s plan was to exit Congo north of Doruma in Haut Uele and travel west into CAR with the possibility of returning to Congo in Bas Uele and back to Garamba, leading the pursuing Ugandan forces in an enormous circle. Troops commanded by Dominic Ongwen were deployed initially near Doruma, then northwest of Dungu in order to protect LRA passage from Bas Uele to Garamba and potentially Sudan’s Western Equatoria State.²³

LRA fighters in Bas Uele accomplished precisely what they were ordered to do: securing control over the strategic border area. Smart’s troops appear to have divided into several groups. These groups were deployed to various spots, including one in Ese, in southern Bas Uele, one further east in Haut Uele, another in central Bas Uele, and two move in between Congo and CAR.²⁴

According to former LRA fighters, one group is commanded by Brigadier ‘Nixman’ Opuk Oryang, one of the LRA’s oldest and most senior commanders. Opuk Oryang was in charge of intelligence gathering for the entire LRA pre-Operation Lightning Thunder, and his presence in the area illustrates the strategic importance of northern Bas Uele to the LRA. A Congolese woman abducted in Sukadi in February 2010 said that one LRA commander had a list of all villages in north of Ango territory, next to the CAR border.²⁵ Most villages had been crossed out.²⁶

The LRA’s behaviour in Bas Uele, and more widely in Congo, indicates a well-developed strategy focused on maintaining a presence in Congo that enables cross-border activity in CAR, Sudan, and potentially a route back to northern Uganda via Garamba National Park. A recent letter allegedly sent by an LRA group—around March 2010 when Kony moved from CAR to Congo—asks the Congolese authorities to stop attacking the LRA in return for a cessation of LRA attacks against Congolese civilians.²⁷

The LRA’s activity demonstrates a commitment to maintaining the option of returning to Uganda. A Congolese woman abducted in Banda, taken as a “wife” by an LRA commander, said that he told her, “We will wait until next year [2011] in Congo and then we will re-enter Uganda.”²⁸ Two LRA fighters said that Lieutenant Colonel Okot Odek told them the LRA will soon regroup inside Garamba, a potential transit point to Uganda.²⁹

Humanitarian impact

More than 5,000 Congolese refugees, mostly from the northern part of Bas Uele live in refugee camps in the towns of Zemio, Mboki, and Obo in CAR.³⁰ These numbers increase on a daily basis as LRA attacks in Congo continue. A group of at least 100 refu-

gees arrived in Zemio at the end of March 2010, following recent LRA attacks in Digba and Sukadi that killed 20 civilians.³¹ Refugees in CAR have received some international assistance, but these relief supplies remain sporadic and unreliable.

According to recent reports, 58,000 people in Bas Uele have been internally displaced mostly due to LRA attacks. More than 34,000 internally displaced people, or IDPs, are in Ango territory, the worst affected region in Bas Uele. Spread across different locations in Bas Uele and hard to reach due to poor infrastructure, IDPs receive little to no help. Only emergency aid organizations such as MSF, Caritas, and a few smaller religious-based organizations have been able to supply food, notably in Banda, Ango, and Dingila. Many thousands of internally displaced, however, receive no help as international organizations, including the United Nations, do not operate in the region due to fear of LRA attacks.

FARDC abuses of civilians and lack of response to LRA attacks

The Congolese national army deployed troops to LRA-affected areas in Bas Uele in June and July of 2009.³² A group of soldiers from Battalion “Guepard” from FARDC’s fourth battalion arrived in Banda on June 1, 2009, more than two months after the initial LRA attack of March 15.

FARDC soldiers go unpaid for months and do not receive their food rations. To survive, soldiers erect checkpoints and extort money and food from travellers. A U.N. inter-agency mission found that FARDC troops in Dingila “did not receive any support from their chain of command, lack food, and instead illegally collect 50 percent of the taxes collected by the Communication and Transport administrator, a situation which leads to considerable abuses by the army.”³³

The lack of any oversight over FARDC troops has led to grave abuses against the population including beatings and sexual harassment. There were 59 recorded cases of rape in Dingila committed by FARDC soldiers from March 2009 to July 2009.³⁴ More than half of the reported rapes were committed against internally displaced people escaping LRA attacks in the north. The numbers are likely much higher than reported as survivors of sexual violence rarely come forward for fear of being stigmatized. A NGO report that collected information on sexual violence found that for the month of July 2009 there were more than 70 cases of rape in Dingila, mostly committed by FARDC soldiers.³⁵ Official numbers for July put the number of reported rapes at only eight.³⁶

FARDC behaviour worsened after November 2009 when a group from the notorious “Ours” battalion arrived in Banda to replace elements from Guepard. Troops from Ours are known to have committed massive abuses in Haut Uele where they were previously based.³⁷

Recent reports state that FARDC abuses in Bas Uele have continued. Local leaders in Bangadi and Banda revealed in February 2010 that FARDC troops had raped or sexually abused 63 women and girls in the first two months of 2010.³⁸ A report from an NGO states that 17 girls under 18 years of age were raped by FARDC soldiers in Banda in the month of December 2009.³⁹ There has been very little or no disciplinary action taken against soldiers committing abuses against Congolese civilians.

FARDC response to LRA attacks has been almost nonexistent. There are only 13 FARDC soldiers in the entire Assa *chefferie*, the administrative unit close to the CAR border heavily attacked by the LRA.⁴⁰ FARDC soldiers do not respond to LRA aggression, sometimes even fleeing their attacks.⁴¹ Due to the lack of any protection from the violence, most of the population has left. Those who stayed behind—mostly the elderly who cannot walk for long periods of time—spend their nights in the bush afraid of LRA attacks.⁴² “The LRA took our land and made us refugees,” said a Congolese woman, who was abducted and raped by an LRA commander. “And our government does nothing about it.”⁴³

MONUSCO

The U.N. mission in DRC, known as MONUC until it was renamed MONUSCO in July 2010, has only one base in Bas Uele, in Dingila, south of the Uele River. Deployed in July 2009, 44 peacekeepers from a Moroccan battalion and 39 troops from a Guatemalan special force unit—later replaced by a Senegalese force—are tasked with protecting the civilian population and verifying the presence of LRA troops in the area.⁴⁴ Despite continuing LRA threats in the area, the peacekeepers in Dingila are in the process of withdrawal, leaving no U.N. presence in Bas Uele. This is part of a larger MONUSCO troop withdrawal planned for this summer, as requested by Congolese authorities, and approved by the U.N. Security Council at the beginning of June 2010.

The Congolese government believes the FARDC is able to adequately fill the security vacuum created by the departure of the U.N. peacekeepers. This sentiment was recently shared by the head of the MONUSCO peacekeeping forces, General Babacar Gaye. In a visit to Dingila on April 20, 2010, announcing the withdrawal of the peacekeepers, General Gaye said, “I am convinced that the FARDC troops, deploying with a maximum of support and with good chiefs leading the company which will be based here, will certainly handle things in the same way that the 321st battalion did in Equateur, that is to say, by displaying professional behaviour.”⁴⁵

General Gaye’s assessment is surprising, given the inability of FARDC troops in Province Orientale to confront the LRA, as well as the rampant abuses against Congolese civilians documented in this and previous Enough reports.⁴⁶ And according to a recent Reuters article, Congolese army units in Equateur province, located west of Bas Uele, have been highly abusive to civilians. The article explains how Congolese

refugees from Equateur Province living in the Republic of Congo refuse to return home fearing FARDC abuses. A Congolese refugee quoted in the article says, “We tried to return home, were attacked by the army. Some of our wives were raped by them.”⁴⁷

The presence of peacekeepers in Dingila has helped to deter LRA attacks that have taken place nearby but not in Dingila. The peacekeepers have also contributed to providing security for at least 5,000 internally displaced people escaping LRA attacks in the north. The civil society of Dingila opposed the withdrawal of U.N. peacekeepers fearing increased insecurity. In a public statement, civil society leaders asked for MONUC deployment to other locations in Bas Uele, especially in Ango territory. Dingila civil society leaders rightly fear that the withdrawal of peacekeepers will attract LRA attacks and force the few international organizations offering aid relief in the region to leave. They point to the disproportionate MONUSCO troop deployment in the Kivus in the south where over 15,000 peacekeepers operate while only 1,000 peacekeepers are based in the entire north where the LRA attacks.

Conclusion

The LRA continues to terrorize populations in remote areas with little or no consequence. The lack of attention paid to the suffering of civilians in Sudan, CAR, and Congo has allowed the LRA survive in remote areas where it regroups and is able to launch attacks that continue to threaten regional security. The pursuing Ugandan army forces cannot physically chase highly mobile LRA groups in vast areas of Congo, especially as these groups cross national borders frequently. The Congolese government and army have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from LRA attacks. MONUSCO cannot continue to regard the LRA as a secondary threat to civilians in Congo. The LRA has killed and maimed more people in Congo in the last 18 months than any other rebel force.

The law signed by President Obama on May 24, 2010 has the potential to increase the chances of apprehending Kony and his commanders and removing the LRA threat. The United States will need to seize this opportunity by leading renewed international efforts at the Security Council, galvanizing key allies with interests and capabilities that can help bring Kony to justice, and catalyzing much stronger action on the ground that will actually deliver some measure of security to civilians in Congolese Bas Uele and central Africa in general.

Appendix

Chronology of LRA Attacks in Bas Uele, Democratic Republic of the Congo

March 2009 – April 2010

Date	Location	Description
3/15/09	Banda	Thirty killed, 300 abducted, 20,000 displaced.
3/18/09	Banda	UPDF arrives in Banda following March 15 attack.
3/22/09	Zamoy	Eighteen km north of Banda, direction of Pasi.
3/23/09	Melinda	Fifty km south of Banda, in Poko.
3/23/09	Angar	Fifty-five km south of Banda, in Poko.
3/23/09	Boso	Sixty km south of Banda, in Poko. Two people killed, 20 abducted, including two Mbororo children.
3/29/09	Zamay	Fifteen km west of Banda.
4/10/09-4/11/09	Banda	LRA and UPDF clash. UPDF commander killed.
4/12/09	Banda	
5/21/09-5/22/09	Boeli	Three km southwest of Banda. Two killed, 21 abducted.
5/22/09	Banda	FARDC arrives.
5/27/09	Banda	LRA and UPDF clash 7 km east of Banda.
6/1/10	Banda	FARDC battalion 'Guepard' arrives.
6/2/09	Dakwa	Pharmacy was pillaged. Many people left toward Ango and Bili.
6/4/09	Boso	
6/09	Sukadi	Four people killed, one injured, many displaced to Ango. Five abducted, three are still with the LRA.
7/7/09	Bayule	Thirty-two km west of Dakwa and 35 km east of Ango. Eighty people abducted including three local priests. Local church was pillaged.
7/8/09	Disolo	Seventeen km north of Dingila, in Bambesa territory. Ten people abducted, four were children.
7/14/09	Dakwa	One LRA killed by self-defence militia in attempted LRA attack.
7/31/09- 8/1/09	Hangar	Eight people abducted by seven LRA fighters.
8/1/09	Boso	Five km from Hangar. Sunday market targeted.
8/15/09	Boso	Three killed, many taken. Sunday market targeted.
9/1/09	Buye	Twenty-five km west of Naparka, in Ango territory. Three killed, two abducted.
9/1/10	Samungu	Forty-five km south of Banda. One killed, ten abducted.
9/8/09	Zamay	FARDC and LRA clash 15 km north of Banda. One FARDC injured.
9/16/09	Babitimo	Fifteen km north of Banda. Five killed, 20 abducted.
9/25/09	Digba	Forty-three km north of Ango. Twenty-two people killed, 20 abducted including four children, 14 still with LRA. Over 40 LRA fighters.
10/1/09	Dingila	One killed.
10/2/09	Sassa and Asa in Sukadi	Four killed.
10/5/09	Gwane.	
10/7/09	Digba	Two killed, 20 abducted, 18 houses burned. Many fled to CAR.
10/13/09	Poko	LRA sighted in Api in Poko territory.
10/13/09	Esse	Six km north of Epi.
10/16/09	Zamoi and Bamitimo	
10/21/09	Boso	Fifteen people abducted.
10/26/09	Asa	Twenty-two abducted.
10/31/09	Pasi	One hundred km north of Banda. Two abducted.
11/11/09	Doruma	Four UPDF trucks with at least 400 soldiers seen leaving Doruma in direction of Banda.
11/14/09	Ango	Seven km north of Ango.
12/1/09	Manawoe	
12/2/09	Bagugu	
12/25/09	Sukadi	
12/26/09	Assa	
1/7/10	Makorombo	Twenty-five km from Sukadi. One killed, five women beaten up, two abducted.
2/10	Sukadi/Mboki	One killed between Sukadi and Mboki. Five abducted, two still with LRA.
2/26/10	Dakwa	Six km north of Dakwa. Two killed.
3/1/10	Dakwa	Two killed.
3/15/09-3/20/09	Digba, Sukadi, Dakwa, and Banda	Twenty killed, 15 taken.
3/19/10	Buye	LRA and FARDC clash near Amadi.
3/22/10	Banda	Eighteen km southwest of Banda. Four abducted.
3/29/10	Amadi	Two people on motorcycles abducted.
4/5/10	Zangapay	Nine houses burned.

Endnotes

- 1 This report is based on interviews with refugees from Bas Uele in the Central African Republic, interviews in Haut Uele and Kampala as well as internal reports from international organizations operating in DRC. For more on the LRA in DRC see Ledio Cakaj, "Between a rock and a hard place: LRA attacks and Congolese army abuses in Northeastern Congo" (Washington: Enough Project, 2010), available at <http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/lra-army-abuses-congo?page=show>, while for an analysis of the LRA in the Central African Republic see Ledio Cakaj, "On the heels of Kony: The untold tragedy unfolding in the Central African Republic" (Washington: Enough Project, 2010), available at <http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/heels-of-joseph-kony-commander-of-lords-resistance-army>. For Enough's analysis on the LRA in Sudan see Ledio Cakaj "The Lord's Resistance Army and the Threat Against Civilians in Southern Sudan" (Washington: Enough Project, 2009), available at <http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/lra-threats-southern-sudan>.
- 2 Enough estimates that close to 2000 were killed by the LRA in Haut Uele alone by the end of January 2010. This includes the 300 killed in the Makombo massacres of December 15, 2009 which subsequent research by HRW concluded to have been close to 400. See: Cakaj, "Between a rock and a hard place: LRA and Congolese army abuses in Northeastern Congo." Close to 100 people were killed by the LRA in Niangara territory in Haut Uele between February and April of 2010. Reports from civil society in Haut Uele suggest that at least 200 people were killed by the LRA, mostly in Dungu territory in Haut Uele in the months of March, April and May of 2010. Human Rights Watch, "The Trail of Death" (2010), available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/89320/section/3> and Human Rights Watch, "DR Congo: New round of LRA killing campaign" (2010), available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/05/20/dr-congo-new-round-lra-killing-campaign>.
- 3 A survey by an international organization working in Province Orientale puts the numbers of those abducted in 2009 alone to 554 including children. Enough found 28 cases of abductions for 2010.
- 4 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1925 (2010), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925%282010%29.
- 5 Cakaj, "Between a rock and a hard place: LRA and Congolese army abuses in Northeastern Congo."
- 6 The districts of Bas Uele and Haut Uele make up Province Orientale located in the north eastern corner of the country. Bas Uele has a landmass of 148,000 square meters and a population of over one million. Bas Uele has Haut Uele to its east, Province Equateur to its west and CAR to its north.
- 7 Human Rights Watch, "The Christmas Massacres" (2010), available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/02/16/christmas-massacres>.
- 8 Interviews with former LRA fighters, Gulu, April 16, 2010.
- 9 MONUC/OHCHR, "Summary of fact finding missions on alleged human rights violations committed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the districts of Haut-Uélé and Bas-Uélé in Orientale province of the Democratic Republic of Congo" (2009).
- 10 Interview with NGO director, Dungu, December 8, 2009.
- 11 See appendix for a detailed listing of attacks.
- 12 Interview with chief of Congolese refugee camp, Zemio, March 15, 2010 and INGO 2009 annual report, January 2010.
- 13 Interview with Congolese priest, Dungu, December 9, 2009.
- 14 Interview with Congolese refugee, Mboki, March 11, 2010.
- 15 Interview with chief of Congolese refugee camp, Zemio, March 15, 2010.
- 16 Interview with chief of Congolese refugee camp, Zemio, March 15, 2010.
- 17 Ibid. also interviews with Congolese refugees, Zemio, March 15, 2010.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Cakaj, "Between a rock and a hard place: LRA and Congolese army abuses in Northeastern Congo."
- 20 Interviews with former LRA fighters, Gulu, April 16, 2010
- 21 Interview with Ugandan intelligence officer. Kampala, November 22, 2009.
- 22 Interviews with former LRA fighters, April 16, 2010.
- 23 Ongwen's forces also split; one group operates northeast of Doruma and secures passage to Sudan's Western Equatoria State, while another forays southwest of Dungu, in Niangara territory.
- 24 Interviews with former LRA fighters, Gulu, April 16, 2010. and MONUC internal reports. This group seems to be based where river Gourba joins river Uele, although this might have changed by now.
- 25 Interview with Congolese refugee, Zemio, March 15, 2010.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Interview with Congolese civil society member, Kampala, May 27, 2010.
- 28 Interview with Congolese refugee, Mboki, March 11, 2010.
- 29 Interview with former LRA fighters, Gulu, June 10, 2010.
- 30 Ledio Cakaj, "On the heels of Kony: The untold tragedy unfolding in the Central African Republic."
- 31 Phone interview with humanitarian worker, April 13, 2010.
- 32 Interagency mission reports to Banda and Dakwa (September 2009) and Dingila, August 17-21 2009. 18 FARDC troops were sent to Dingila on March 7, 2009.
- 33 Interagency mission to Dingila, August 17-21, 2009. "Ils ne reçoivent aucune assistance de leur hiérarchie, n'ont pas de ration alimentaire et c'est le chef du poste d'encadrement administratif qui les nourrit par le canal du service des Transports et Communication qui leur reverse 50 pour cent des taxes perçues."
- 34 Interagency report, Dingila, July 21, 2009.
- 35 INGO internal report, Bas Uele, August 2009.
- 36 Interagency report, Dingila, July 21, 2009.
- 37 Cakaj, "Between a rock and a hard place, LRA and Congolese army abuses in Northeastern Congo."
- 38 Interview with Congolese civil society leaders, Kampala, February 20, 2010.
- 39 Internal INGO report, January 2010.
- 40 Interview with Congolese refugee, Zemio, March 15, 2010.
- 41 Interviews with Congolese refugees in Zemio, Mboki and Obo. A man in the Mboki refugee camp said that FARDC soldiers in Gwane told the population to go to Dingila or to CAR.
- 42 Interview with Congolese refugee, Zemio, March 15, 2010.
- 43 Interview with with Congolese refugee, Zemio, March 15, 2010.
- 44 Interview with MONUC officer, Dungu, December 9, 2009.
- 45 MONUC, "The Senegalese contingent stationed at Dingila outpost, Oriental Province, prepares to leave," Press Release, April 21, 2010, available at <http://monuc.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1042&ctl=Details&mid=1096&Itemid=8648>.
- 46 See Cakaj, "Between a rock and a hard place, LRA and Congolese army abuses in Northeastern Congo."
- 47 Reuters, "Fearing own army DR Congo refugees remain abroad," May 27, 2010, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE64Q22P_CH_2420.

Enough is a project of the Center for American Progress to end genocide and crimes against humanity. Founded in 2007, Enough focuses on the crises in Sudan, eastern Congo, areas affected by the Lord's Resistance Army, and Somalia. Enough's strategy papers and briefings provide sharp field analysis and targeted policy recommendations based on a "3P" crisis response strategy: promoting durable peace, providing civilian protection, and punishing perpetrators of atrocities. Enough works with concerned citizens, advocates, and policy makers to prevent, mitigate, and resolve these crises. To learn more about Enough and what you can do to help, go to www.enoughproject.org.

